State of North Carolina vs. Antonio Tobias Greene (COA25-506), is a case out of Wake County in which the Mr. Greene raises two issues on appeal. First he challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Second, he asserts that the trial court erred by allowing remote testimony by a minor. We will take a look at how the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed both of these issues.
In September of 2022, Ms. Hinton was fatally killed from a gunshot to her ribcage while she was sitting in her living room. Prior to being shot, Mr. Greene, who had been in a three-year tumultuous relationship with Ms. H, had left the living room, went outside, and fired a shot into the air and another shot into the ground. Ms. Hinton’s two sons and Mr. Greene’s son were in bedrooms of the home during the shooting. Relatives of Mr. Greene were in the living room during the shooting. Upon hearing gunshots, Ms. Hinton’s older minor son (Minor) went into the living room where he found his mother. He called 911. Law enforcement responded to the scene where they found two shell casings near the curb and a bullet inside the home. Mr. Greene left the home prior to law enforcement’s arrival but he surrendered to authorities the next day. After his arrest, Mr. Greene stated to law enforcement that he shot the firearm once in the air and then a second time into the ground.
A Wake County grand jury indicted Mr. Greene for first-degree murder. The State prosecuted the case at trial under the felony murder rule with the underlying felony being discharging a weapon into an occupied property. The State based its case on the theories of Mr. Greene firing into the home and directly killing Ms. Hinton; and Mr. Greene shooting into the ground and the bullet ricocheting and entering the home and Ms. Hinton’s body. Minor testified remotely at trial about what he heard the night of his mother’s shooting. During the charge conference, Mr. Greene requested that the jury be instruction on involuntary manslaughter. That request was denied by the trial court and the trial court went on to instruct the jury on the following: first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation; first-degree murder based on the felony murder rule; second-degree murder; voluntary manslaughter; or not guilty. At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Greene was found guilty of first-degree felony murder. He gave timely notice of appeal. Mr. Greene’s arguments on appeal pertain to the trial court’s denial of his request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter and the trial court allowing Minor to testify remotely.
In asserting that the trial court erred by denying his request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, Mr. Greene argues that his statement to the police that he shot the gun into the air and then into the ground negates the “into property” element of the underlying felony of discharging a weapon into an occupied property. Based on this reasoning, Mr. Greene argues that the trial court erred by not giving his requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The Court pointed out that discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle has been determined to be a “general intent” crime where the State does not need to prove any specific intent. The State is only required to prove that the defendant committed the act, which is the act of shooting the firearm. The Court found that this principle applies in this case. Moreover, discharging a weapon into an occupied property qualifies as an underlying felony for felony murder. Thus, the Court found that the trial court did not err by denying Mr. Greene’s request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
Mr. Greene next contended that by allowing Minor to testify remotely, the trial court denied his state and federal constitutional rights as well as violated the provisions concerning remote testimony as governed by N.C.G.S. §15A-1225.1.
The constitutional arguments regarding Minor’s remote testimony pertain to a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. Because this issue raises a constitutional question-, the appellate Court conducted a de novo review. Mr. Greene argued that his right to confront was violated because he was not able to contemporaneously confer with his attorney during his attorney’s cross-examination of Minor. However, the appellate Court noted that confrontation does not give the guarantee of a face-to-face interaction of a defendant and a witness. Under the state or federal constitution, the confrontation clause is satisfied so long as there is some type of simultaneous communication channel between the defendant and his cross-examining attorney. Here the record showed that Mr. Greene remained in direct communication with one attorney who was present with him in a side room. Mr. Greene’s other attorney remained in the courtroom where he conducted the cross-examination of Minor. Mr. Greene was allowed to communicate with the cross-examining attorney via text or by pinging the court via Webex to ask the trial court for a recess or for time to confer with his cross-examining attorney privately. On appeal, Mr. Greene never argued that he attempted to speak with this cross-examining attorney during the cross-examination of Minor. The Court found nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court denied Mr. Greene an opportunity to speak with his cross-examining attorney in private nor any inability for Mr. Greene to communicate contemporaneously with his cross-examining attorney. The Court consequently found no violation of Mr. Greene’s state or federal constitutional rights.
Next, Mr. Greene argues that the trial court did not comply with provisions of N.C.G.S. §15A-1225.1 when Minor was allowed to testify remotely. Because the alleged violations of a statute are a question of law, the Court conducted its review de novo. Under N.C.G.S. §15A-1225.1(b)(1)-(2), remote testimony of a minor in a criminal proceeding is allowed when the trial court determines that the minor “would suffer severe emotional distress” by testifying in the presence of the defendant and that the minor’s “…ability to communicate with the trier of fact would be impaired.” The trial court is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Minor’s stepmother regarding the emotional distress that Minor experienced since his mother’s shooting death. Mr. Greene argues on appeal that expert testimony is required at the hearing in order to support a minor’s need to testify remotely. However, the appellate Court found that the statute does not require the testimony of an expert. Therefore, the trial court properly relied on the testimony of Minor’s stepmother.
Mr. Greene also argued that the stepmother’s testimony was insufficient to substantiate Minor’s ability or inability to testify in front of him. The stepmother testified that since his mother’s death, she and Minor’s father had been his primary caretakers. Also, since his mother’s death, Minor has been diagnosed with PTSD, anxiety, and depression; had been in therapy; had been on medication leading up to the trial; and had also suffered from sleeplessness and had been “on edge” leading up to the trial. The appellate Court found this testimony sufficient for the trial court to determine whether Minor could testify in front of Mr. Greene and supported the trial court’s decision to allow remote testimony.
Finally, Mr. Greene argues that the trial court did not provide a written order of its findings of fact and conclusions of law which prevented meaningful appellate review. However, the appellate Court noted that again a written order is not required under the statute. Moreover, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were clear from the transcript. Because there is no statutory requirement for a written order and that the record allows for a meaningful appellate review to be conducted, the appellate Court found nothing improper regarding the lack of a written order by the trial court.
After conducting its review of Mr. Greene’s assertions of error regarding the denial of his requested jury instruction and allowing Minor to testify remotely, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that no error was committed by the trial court. Mr. Greene received a fair trial free from any violation of his constitutional or statutory rights.
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