In State of North Carolina v. Dana Alden Latta, Jr. (139PA25), the North Carolina Supreme Court addresses whether Mr. Latta was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea after he did not appear to be sentenced on that plea until over twenty years later. In this Durham County case, the Supreme Court applies N.C.G.S. §15A-1024, N.C.G.S. §15A-1340.13, and federal case law in its analysis.

In August of 2001,Mr. Latta and another man confronted four women at a massage parlor in Durham. One of the men put a gun to the head of one of the women and moved her to another part of the building. The men took $648 from the women and then left. A Durham County grand jury ultimately indicted Mr. Latta on three counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, two counts of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of second-degree kidnapping.

In June of 2002, Mr. Latta pled guilty to all charges pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. Per the plea agreement, the State would support a prison sentence of sixty-one to eighty-one months provided that Mr. Latta testify truthfully in the case against his co-defendant and the judge presiding over his co-defendant’s case found as a fact that Mr. Latta provided such testimony. After pleading guilty, Mr. Latta posted bond and fled North Carolina. Mr. Latta did not appear in court for the agreed upon sentencing in November of 2002.

In December of 2022, the State dismissed all charges with leave to reinstate them. On the dismissal forms, the State indicated as the reason for the dismissal, “defendant failed to appear for the criminal proceeding at which [his] attendance was required and the prosecutor believe[d] that [he] [could not] readily be found.” When Mr. Latta was arrested almost twenty years later in Vance County on drug-related charges, the State reinstated the 2002 charges.

In January of 2023, Mr. Latta moved to withdraw his 2002 guilty plea. In support of his motion, Mr. Latta argued he was incarcerated at the time of the scheduled November 2002 sentencing and he had been incarcerated at various times and in other states since 2002. During these intervening years and incarcerations, Mr. Latta pointed out that the State never sought to extradite him for the 2002 charges. He relied on State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532 (1990) in that it would be “fair and just” to allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

In opposing Mr. Latta’s motion, the State argued that Mr. Latta had not shown “fair and just” grounds for granting his motion. The State argued that allowing Mr. Latta to withdraw his plea would result in prejudice to the State. In support of its reasoning, the State argued that the original investigator on the case had retired; one of the complaining witnesses had passed away; another complaining witness was no longer interested participating in the prosecution of the case; and the massage parlor where the crimes occurred was no longer in existence.

The trial court denied Mr. Latta’s motion and proceeded to sentencing. Both the State and Mr. Latta stipulated that Mr. Latta’s prior record level (PRL) in 2024 was higher than it was in 2002. Mr. Latta was a PRL I in 2002 and during the intervening years, he amassed criminal convictions such that he was a PRL IV in 2024. The parties also stipulated to the mitigating factors that Mr. Latta had assisted in the apprehension of another felon and that he had accepted responsibility for his crimes at an early stage in the case. The trial court sentenced Mr. Latta in accordance with the sentencing guidelines that were in existence in 2002, but at a PRL IV. The sentence imposed was for seventy-one to ninety-five months in prison. Mr. Latta gave notice of appeal.

Before the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Mr. Latta argued that his motion to withdraw should have been allowed in accordance with Handy which states, “a presentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty should be allowed for any fair and just reason.” 326 N.C. at 539. Mr. Latta also argued that by not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court violated N.C.G.S. §15A-1024 after it imposed a sentence different from the one specified in the plea agreement.

The appellate Court rejected Mr. Latta’s first argument. In so doing, the Court noted the factors set forth in Handy that are to used when determining a fair and just reason exists for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty. Those factors are: whether the defendant has asserted legal innocence, the strength of the State’s proffer of evidence, the length of time between entry of the guilty plea and the desire to change it, and whether the accused has had competent counsel at all relevant times. Misunderstanding of the consequences of a guilty plea, hasty entry, confusion, and coercion are also factors for consideration. State v. Latta, 299 N.C. App. 103, 105 (2025) (quoting Handy, 326 N.C. at 539). In his argument to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Latta did not address any of the factors set forth in Latta. He only argued that he cooperated fully with the investigation and that he aided in the apprehension of another felon.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Latta that the trial court violated N.C.G.S. §15A-1024 by not allowing him to withdraw his plea after it imposed a sentence that differed from the one specified in the plea agreement. The judgement entered by the trial court was vacated and the case was remanded where the trial court was instructed to sentence Mr. Latta “to a term not to exceed that which [he] agreed on in the 2002 plea agreement”; or offer Mr. Latta the opportunity to withdraw his plea “if the trial court maintains that a greater sentence is warranted.” Latta, 299 N.C. App. at 107. The State filed a petition for discretionary review of the decision by the Court of Appeals. The State’s petition was allowed.

In applying Morris v. Rodeberg, 385 N.C. 405, 409 (2023) the Court deemed the case as one that involved an interpretation of statutory or contractual provisions by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the decision by the Court of Appeals was reviewed de novo. There was no disagreement between the parties regarding the terms of the plea agreement. The core issue for the Supreme Court to decide was whether N.C.G.S. §15A-1024 required the trial court to allow Mr. Latta to withdraw his guilty plea.

N.C.G.S. §15A-1024 provides: If at the time of sentencing, the judge for any reason determines to impose a sentence other than provided for in a plea arrangement between the parties, the judge must inform the defendant of that fact and inform the defendant that he may withdraw his plea. Upon withdrawal, the defendant is entitled to a continuance until the next session of court.

The State contended that N.C.G.S. §15A-1340.13, found in the Structured Sentencing Act, would prohibit the trial court from sentencing Mr. Latta to the sentence specified in the plea agreement. When the State and Mr. Latta entered into the plea agreement in 2002, Mr. Latta was a PRL I. At the time of his sentencing in 2024, he was now a PRL IV. In the view of the State, the circumstances of this case presented an apparent conflict between N.C.G.S. §15A-1024 and N.C.G.S. §15A-1340.13.

The Court, however, found that no such statutory dilemma existed here. The record did not establish that Mr. Latta had complied with the express terms of the plea agreement. The plea agreement was made up of two documents: “Agreement to Cooperate and Testify” and a “Transcript of Plea.” Under the “Agreement to Cooperate and Testify,” Mr. Latta was obligated to “cooperate in the investigation” and “provide any and all TRUTHFUL testimony.” Under the “Transcript of Plea,” the judge presiding over the co-defendant’s case would need to make a finding that Mr. Latta had satisfied his oblation under the “Agreement to Cooperate and Testify.” If the presiding judge made such a finding, then the State would pray judgment and Mr. Latta would receive the sentence specified in the plea agreement. The record did not indicate that the presiding judge in Mr. Latta’s co-defendant’s case ever made such a finding regarding Mr. Latta’s compliance with the “Agreement to Cooperate and Testify.”

The Court also found that even if Mr. Latta fully cooperated in the prosecution of his co-defendant, he still violated the terms of the plea agreement by flee North Carolina and failing to appear in court for sentencing at the agreed upon time. The Court cites the case of United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 1995) in which the defendant had a similar arrangement with the government to provide substantial assistance in exchange for a lower sentencing recommendation. Although the defendant did provide the required assistance, he fled the country and failed to appear for sentencing. The defendant ultimately returned to the United States and the sentencing took place nine months later than originally planned. The government refused to honor the agreement and the defendant was sentenced for a term longer than the agreement called for. The case was appealed and the Fourth Circuit ruled that by failing to appear for sentencing as agreed upon, the defendant had violated the terms of the plea agreement and the government’s obligation to present a lower sentencing recommendation had ended. Similarly, by fleeing the state and failing to appear at sentencing, Mr. Latta had violated an implied term of his plea agreement.

The Court found that the plea agreement ceased to govern the terms of Mr. Latta’s sentence and the trial court’s imposition of a sentence consistent with Mr. Latta’s 2024 PRL did not violate any of his rights under  N.C.G.S. 15A-1024.

The Court concluded its analysis by point out the profound injustice that would result if Mr. Latta’s post-plea convictions allowed him to avoid the consequences of his guilty plea. The more than two decades that passed between the guilty plea and sentencing created recognizable challenges for the State in prosecuting the case. The ends of justice would be frustrated, not furthered, if Mr. Latta were allowed to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.