In State of North Carolina vs. Krystal Diane Reynolds (COA25-546), Ms. Reynolds appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. In this unpublished opinion out of Wake County, the appellate Court conducts a very fact intensive review. The Court’s review leads to its decision to uphold the ruling of the trial court based largely on the totality of the circumstances.
In February of 2022, two law enforcement officers responded to a call regarding an assault. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers were met by the complaining witness who pointed out an individual who was involved in the assault. That individual denied involvement in the assault but was detained due to him smelling like marijuana. The complaining witness also directed one of the officers to a parked vehicle where the alleged assault occurred. The officer approached the vehicle and immediately smelled marijuana which lead to a search of the vehicle. The officer asked the driver of the vehicle about the individual that was initially questioned but the driver denied knowing that individual. However, that individual’s identification was found in the front seat of the vehicle. Also found in the vehicle was a bag of marijuana under the driver's seat and under the floor mat in the backseat was a loaded pistol.
The complaining witness who previously identified the initial suspect and the vehicle associated with the alleged assault approached one of the officers again with additional information. This time he told the officer that two suspects fled from the backseat of the vehicle to Ms. Reynolds’s house which was located across the street. Ms. Reynolds was standing outside her home when the officer approached. When asked if two people had gone into her home, Ms. Reynolds denied this. The officer went back to the witness to verify the information that he received and the witness responded that he “was ten thousand percent sure” that two individuals went into Ms. Reynolds’s house and that he would “bet his life on it.” He further asserted that he had reported activities concerning Ms. Reynolds and the suspects to the police on prior occasions. The officer conducted a second search of the vehicle where he found more drugs and drug paraphernalia.
Three officers then approached Ms. Reynolds’s home and asked for permission to search her residence. Ms. Reynolds said the officers could look on the first floor of the home but nowhere else. At this point, one of the officers believed that Ms. Reynolds was either hiding the suspects or in danger herself. One of the officers repeatedly asked Ms. Reynolds to step outside of her house and said that he would be seeking a search warrant. When Ms. Reynolds did not step out of her home, the officer grabbed her by her arm and lead her out of the house. Ms. Reynolds asked to put on her shoes and when allowed she took a seat outside on her patio. The officer walked away to his patrol car while the other two officers remained with Ms. Reynolds.
The two officers again asked Ms. Reynolds for permission to search her home and she agreed to accompany those two officers on a search of her residence. Ms. Reynolds walked the officers throughout her house where the two suspects were found hiding in a third floor bedroom closet. The individuals were detained and the third officer told Ms. Reynolds to come with him to the patrol car. She refused and began striking and kicking the officer when he tried to put her in handcuffs. Ms. Reynolds was arrested and charged with resisting, delaying, and obstructing a law enforcement officer and assault on a government official.
Ms. Reynolds filed a motion to suppress which was denied by the trial court. Ms. Reynolds then plead guilty to three counts of assault on a government official and reserved her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. After the trial court imposed a suspended sentence, Ms. Reynolds gave notice of appeal.
Ms. Reynolds raised some interesting arguments on appeal. She asserted that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the officers removed her from her home without probable cause and with no exigent circumstances being present. She alleged that these actions violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Her arguments are based on four separate grounds. First, she challenges two findings of fact by the trial court. Second, she challenges that there was probable cause for the resisting a public officer charge. Third, she challenges her removal from her home during the seizure of her home. Finally, she challenges the protective sweep of her home conducted by the officers.
In its review of the trial court’s denial of Ms. Reynolds’s motion to suppress, the appellate Court examined the record in order to determine whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact supported the conclusions of law. Conclusions of law were reviewed de novo.
The first finding of fact that Ms. Reynolds challenged was a finding that pertained to the complaining witness’s statements regarding the suspects who fled into Ms. Reynolds’s home and the statements the complaining witness made about past drug transactions involving the suspects. The appellate Court found that there was compelling evidence to support this finding of fact. Ms. Reynolds also argued that the trial court’s finding of fact concerning nervous behavior displayed by her during her interactions with the law enforcement officers was not supported by competent evidence. The appellate Court again found that there was competent evidence to support this finding of fact. With respect to each of these findings of fact, the Court noted that both pertained more to the weight to be given to the evidence and not whether it was competent. Furthermore, the Court gave deference to the trial court’s findings due to the fact that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the officers as they were testifying.
Ms. Reynolds then argued that the statements of the complaining witness and her demeanor were insufficient to support probable cause for the resisting a public officer charge. The Court noted that a defendant can be properly charged with resisting, delay, or obstructing a public officer when they willfully and unlawfully engage in conduct that resists, delays, or obstructs a public officer who is discharging or attempting to discharge their official duty. The Court employed a totality of the circumstances analysis to conclude that probable cause did exist in this instance. The officers were able to verify the information that they obtained from the complaining witness. They were able to find drugs and a firearm in the vehicle based on information provided by the complaining witness. The complaining witness also told the officers where the suspects could be found. Ms. Reynolds initially denied that the suspects were in her home and her demeanor changed during her interaction with the officers. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed to charge Ms. Reynolds with resisting a public officer.
Ms. Reynolds also argued that the trial court erred by concluding that the officers could remove her from her home while the home was seized due to exigent circumstances. When exigent circumstances exist, law enforcement may temporarily restrain an individual without a warrant when there is a concern that the individual may destroy evidence while the officer is working to obtain a search warrant. Here since there was probable cause to arrest Ms. Reynolds for resisting a public officer, the officers could lawfully detain her. Moreover, the Court looked at the totality of the circumstances and also concluded that the officers had probable cause to seize the home and detain Ms. Reynolds until a search warrant could be obtained. The complaining witness had given the officers information that lead to the discovery of drugs, a firearm, and the two suspects hiding in Ms. Reynolds’s home. The law enforcement officers had a valid concern that Ms. Reynolds was either helping the suspects or being forced to help them. The totality of the circumstances indicate that the officers could seize the home until a search warrant was obtained.
The appellate Court did agree with Ms. Reynolds that the record did not support law enforcement having the authority to conduct a protective sweep which the trial court concluded was lawful. However, this error by the trial court was not sufficient to reverse its ruling on Ms. Reynolds’s motion to suppress. Protective sweeps are conducted incident to lawful arrests and are performed in order to protect the safety of officers and others. Here, Ms. Reynolds was not arrested until after the officers conducted the consensual search of her home. Furthermore, the record did not indicate that the officers felt threatened by Ms. Reynolds at any time. Hence, the Court vacated the trial court’s conclusion law regarding the lawfulness of the protective sweep.
Because there were other grounds to support that there was no violation of Ms. Reynolds’s Fourth Amendment rights, the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was upheld by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. However, the trial court’s order was modified to vacate its conclusion of law that the protective sweep was lawful.
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