A garden variety of issues were before the North Carolina Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Phelps. This case was filed in June of 2026 and arose out of Pitt County. The Greenville Police responded to a call of shots fired. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers saw a man and a woman standing next to a car with bullet holes. The man showed the officers a photo of the shooter’s vehicle and informed the officers of the address where this individual potentially lived. The shooter was later identified as Mr. Phelps. The officers proceeded to this address where they found Mr. Phelps and his wife. Initially, the officers conducted a protective sweep of the residence. During this sweep, the officers observed firearms in plain view. Mr. Phelps’s wife told the officers that they were fired upon and that Mr. Phelps then returned fire. She informed the officers that the firearm used by Mr. Phelps had been stored in their bedroom. The officers obtained a search warrant for the residence including the vehicle. During the search, the officers found numerous firearms throughout the residence. In addition, they also found a grenade like device. An SBI bomb technician would later testify that had this grenade like device been operated as intended, it would have “been able to explode.” Spent shell casings were also found in the driver’s seat of the vehicle.
Mr. Phelps was indicted on two counts of possession of a firearm by felon and three counts of possession of a weapon of mass destruction. During the trial, the State presented evidence of Mr. Phelps’s 2011 conviction for first degree burglary. Neither the man nor the woman who reported the shooting to the officers testified at the trial. Mr. Phelps’s wife also did not testify. The court issued a limiting instruction to the jury that they were not to address any allegations concerning the shooting. Any evidence presented pertaining to the shooting was being offered only for context. The jury was not to decide anything regarding the shooting. The trial court issued this admonition to the jury twice during the course of the trial. This limiting instruction would prove to be crucial in the eyes of the appellate Court. Mr. Phelps made timely motions to dismiss one count each of each charge. These motions were denied by the trial court and Mr. Phelps was convicted of two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon and two counts of possession of a weapon of mass destruction.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s denials of Mr. Phelps’s motions to dismiss de novo. The review of the trial court’s denials of the motions to dismiss were conducted in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State every reasonable inference. and resolving all contradictions in favor of the State. However, even given this standard, the Court of Appeals was still constrained by the trial court’s instruction to the jury about limiting purpose of the evidence that was admitted regarding the shooting. Mr. Phelps argued that his motion to dismiss the possession of a firearm by a felon charge should have been granted primarily largely on this limiting instruction given by the trial court. The State in turn argued that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support convictions for two separate counts of possession of a firearm by felon because each count related to possessions a two separate locations. All of the evidence admitted during the trial concerning the shooting was for the limited purpose of providing context. This evidence was not admitted for any other purpose. The statements offered into evidence regarding the shooting by the three individuals who did not testify were deemed to be hearsay and not substantive. Consequently, there was no substantive evidence presented at trial that Mr. Phelps possessed a firearm at the time of the shooting. There was only constructive evidence of his possession of a firearm at the residence. The Court of Appeals concluded that one count of possession of a firearm by a felon must be reversed.
The Court then turned its attention to the motion to dismiss one count of possession of a weapon of mass destruction. N.C.G.S. §14-288.8(a) is the statute that governs this offense. The Court begins by recognizing whether a defendant can lawfully be convicted of more than one count of possession of a weapon of mass destruction based on his simultaneous possession of multiple weapons of mass destruction is an issue of first impression. The Court’s relies on rule of lenity and prior court decisions to come to its conclusion. Whenever a statute does not define with specificity the prosecution unit, the court is to resolve any ambiguity with respect to that unit in favor of lenity. If the statute is ambiguous as to the number of punishments that should be levied for a simultaneous act, the courts are to side with a statutory interpretation that results in the least severe penalty. The relevant statute here does not specify the unit of punishment.
However, the State argued that lenity should not apply in this case due to the heinous nature of the alleged act of possession of a weapon of mass destruction. The Court was not persuaded by this argument and refused to ignore the applicability of the rule of lenity in this case. The Court essentially refused to make a ruling that conflicted with similar precedent and implied that it was ultimately up to the legislature to address any statutory ambiguity. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss one count of possession of a firearm by felon and reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss one count of possession of a weapon of mass destruction. The case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Given that this case presented an issue of first impression, there is a significant possibility that the State will seek review in the North Carolina Court of Appeals. However, it is my opinion that the Court of Appeals decided this case correctly and hopefully the decision will not be disturbed. The doctrine of lenity does appear to be applicable to the instant case and it the legislature wanted or wants specificity with respect to the units of punishment associated with this statute, then it is free to address this issue as the entity bearing the responsibility for making our laws.
Recent Comments